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competition-kernel-container-escape

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for kernel attack surface, namespace and cgroup boundaries, container isolation assumptions, syscall paths, and escape primitive verification. Use when the user asks to analyze container-to-host escape paths, kernel exploit prerequisites, namespace crossover, capability misuse, or prove whether an exploit primitive crosses the sandbox boundary. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

Published by zhaoxuya520 ↗zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill

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competition-kernel-container-escape

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Use competition-kernel-container-escape to analyze the authorized CTF sandbox boundary defined by [sandbox assumptions] and produce a minimal, evidence-based assessment of whether a container-to-host crossing is possible.

Required inputs

  • [sandbox assumptions]

User-approved starter prompt based on a pinned source version; check current skill requirements before running. Task evidence ↗

SKILL.md

name: competition-kernel-container-escapedescription: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for kernel attack surface, namespace and cgroup boundaries, container isolation assumptions, syscall paths, and escape primitive verification. Use when the user asks to analyze container-to-host escape paths, kernel exploit prerequisites, namespace crossover, capability misuse, or prove whether an exploit primitive crosses the sandbox boundary. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

Competition Kernel Container Escape

Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.

Use this skill when the decisive step is proving a boundary crossing between containerized context and host or higher-privilege kernel context.

Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.

Quick Start

  1. Map runtime isolation first: namespaces, cgroups, seccomp, capabilities, LSM, and mount boundaries.
  2. Separate exploit prerequisite, primitive, and boundary-crossing proof.
  3. Record kernel version, config hints, runtime options, and reachable syscall surface.
  4. Keep instrumented observations separate from pristine challenge path.
  5. Reproduce one minimal primitive-to-boundary-crossing chain.

Workflow

1. Map Isolation And Kernel Surface

  • Record namespace map, cgroup mode, capabilities, seccomp profile, AppArmor or SELinux state, mounted filesystems, and runtime sockets.
  • Note kernel version, distro build hints, module exposure, and container runtime behavior.
  • Keep host and container observations linked to exact node and context.

2. Prove Exploit Primitive And Crossover

  • Show controllable input, trigger condition, affected object, and observable kernel or runtime state change.
  • Capture before and after identity, namespace, mount, or process visibility to prove boundary crossing.
  • Distinguish crash-only behavior from stable capability gain.

3. Reduce To Decisive Escape Chain

  • Compress to: prerequisite state -> primitive trigger -> boundary crossing evidence -> resulting host-level capability.
  • State whether root cause is kernel vulnerability, runtime misconfiguration, capability overgrant, or namespace leak.
  • If path relies mostly on credential replay after initial foothold, hand off to Linux credential pivot skill.

Read This Reference

  • Load references/kernel-container-escape.md for isolation checklist, primitive checklist, and parity guidance.

What To Preserve

  • Kernel and runtime context, capability set, seccomp or LSM state, and namespace map
  • Primitive trigger data, boundary crossing evidence, and resulting capability
  • One minimal reproducible chain from container context to host-relevant effect