Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos delegation, SPN trust edges, S4U abuse, RBCD, constrained or unconstrained delegation, and service-ticket acceptance. Use when the user asks about constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, RBCD, S4U, SPNs, ticket acceptance, or how a Kerberos trust edge turns into effective privilege under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
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Use competition-kerberos-delegation to 在编排器已确认的 CTF 沙箱、节点归属和证据优先级内，审计 [Kerberos 挑战域] 的委派信任边，并交付一个将主体、票据类型、目标 SPN、接受服务及已证明权限串联起来的最小可复现链。
Required inputs
[Kerberos 挑战域]
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SKILL.md
name: competition-kerberos-delegationdescription: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos delegation, SPN trust edges, S4U abuse, RBCD, constrained or unconstrained delegation, and service-ticket acceptance. Use when the user asks about constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, RBCD, S4U, SPNs, ticket acceptance, or how a Kerberos trust edge turns into effective privilege under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
Competition Kerberos Delegation
Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.
Use this skill when the hard part is not "is there Kerberos here," but which delegation edge exists, which ticket is being minted, and which service really accepts it.
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Quick Start
Write the trust chain first: principal -> delegation edge -> ticket type -> target SPN -> accepting service -> resulting privilege.
Separate ticket possession from accepted privilege.
Keep SPNs, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, and service acceptance in one compact evidence block.
Reproduce one minimal delegation chain before broadening into variants.
Tie every privilege claim to a specific accepted ticket or service-side effect.
Workflow
1. Identify The Delegation Edge
Determine whether the path is constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, resource-based constrained delegation, protocol transition, or another trust edge.
Inspect SPNs, ACLs, service accounts, SIDHistory, certificate templates, and replication rights only when they affect the active path.
2. Trace Ticket Minting And Acceptance
Record TGT/TGS type, S4U steps when relevant, delegation flags, PAC or group data, encryption type, cache location, and target SPN.
Prove which service actually accepts the ticket and what capability appears after acceptance.
3. Report The Effective Edge
Compress the chain into one replayable path, not a vague "domain compromise" statement.
Separate candidate edges from the edge that really lands privilege.
Read This Reference
Load references/kerberos-delegation.md for the delegation checklist, ticket fields to preserve, and common proof mistakes.