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hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion (T1490) by querying SIEM/EDR telemetry for vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, and PowerShell shadow-copy-deletion commands. Use when hunting for ransomware preparation or anti-forensics activity, after threat intel flags active campaigns, or when alerts trigger on shadow-copy deletion commands.

Published by mukul975 ↗mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

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hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

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Use hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion to run a hypothesis-driven hunt for shadow-copy deletion across [authorized SIEM/EDR telemetry, hosts, and time range], covering vssadmin, WMIC, PowerShell, and recovery-disabling activity; deliver a T1490 hunt report with evidence, confidence, risk, and recommended response actions.

Required inputs

  • [authorized SIEM/EDR telemetry, hosts, and time range]

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SKILL.md

name: hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletiondescription: Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion (T1490) by querying SIEM/EDR telemetry for vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, and PowerShell shadow-copy-deletion commands. Use when hunting for ransomware preparation or anti-forensics activity, after threat intel flags active campaigns, or when alerts trigger on shadow-copy deletion commands.domain: cybersecuritysubdomain: threat-huntingtags: - threat-hunting- mitre-attack- shadow-copy- ransomware- anti-forensics- t1490- proactive-detectionversion: '1.0'author: mahipallicense: Apache-2.0d3fend_techniques: - Platform Hardening- Restore Object- Restore Configuration- Restore Software- Software Updatenist_csf: - DE.CM-01- DE.AE-02- DE.AE-07- ID.RA-05mitre_attack: - T1046- T1057- T1082- T1083- T1486

Hunting For Shadow Copy Deletion

When to Use

  • When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for shadow copy deletion in the environment
  • After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
  • During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
  • When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
  • During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

Prerequisites

  • EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
  • SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
  • Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
  • Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
  • Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation

Workflow

  1. Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
  2. Identify Data Sources: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
  3. Execute Queries: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
  4. Analyze Results: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
  5. Validate Findings: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
  6. Correlate Activity: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
  7. Document and Report: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.

Key Concepts

ConceptDescription
T1490Inhibit System Recovery
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
T1485Data Destruction

Tools & Systems

ToolPurpose
CrowdStrike FalconEDR telemetry and threat detection
Microsoft Defender for EndpointAdvanced hunting with KQL
Splunk EnterpriseSIEM log analysis with SPL queries
Elastic SecurityDetection rules and investigation timeline
SysmonDetailed Windows event monitoring
VelociraptorEndpoint artifact collection and hunting
Sigma RulesCross-platform detection rule format

Common Scenarios

  1. Scenario 1: Ransomware deleting shadow copies before encryption
  2. Scenario 2: vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet pre-encryption
  3. Scenario 3: WMIC shadowcopy delete via PowerShell
  4. Scenario 4: bcdedit disabling recovery mode before impact

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1490
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]